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Assessments of investors’ risk appetite/aversion stance via indicators often yields re-
sults which seem unsatisfactory (see e.g. Illing and Aaron (2005)). Understanding how 
such indicators work therefore seems essential for further improvements. The present 
paper seeks to contribute to this evolution, focusing on the “Global Risk Appetite Index” 
(GRAI) class of indicators going back to Kumar and Persaud (2002). Looking at interna-
tional stock indices during the subprime crisis in 2007, the plausibility of the GRAIs 
benefits from applying the rank correlation approach of Kumar and Persaud (2002) 
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Non-technical summary 
Changes in investors’ general appetite for or aversion to risk are an important factor in any analysis 
of financial market developments and stability. To meet the need for quantification, a number of risk 
appetite/aversion indicators have been proposed in the literature. When comparing the results ob-
tained with these indicators, however, they often differ in terms of implications (see Illing and Aaron 
(2005)). Then again, the indicators also tend to vary in important aspects, such as their underlying 
concept of investors’ aggregate-level risk appetite. “Theory-based indicators” aim for a narrower 
concept, for instance, when they attempt to disentangle the effects of changes in overall risk appe-
tite on the relative demand for risky assets from those due to changes in risk assessments. Since 
the indicators rely on modeling assumptions, the extent to which such a separation is feasible in 
empirical applications hinges on the degree to which those assumptions are violated. Other indica-
tors instead simply focus on the combination of both effects as reflected in market data. They con-
centrate therefore on a broader notion of aggregate-level risk appetite. A further observation is that 
indicator results often also might not correspond well to obvious expectations regarding the likely 
risk appetite stance in financial markets during critical periods (see Illing and Aaron (2005)). This 
represents an even more obvious problem with respect to plausibility and usefulness. The present 
paper investigates the extent to which we can exploit a better understanding of how an indicator 
concept actually works for improvements. In this respect, we focus on the popular “Global Risk Ap-
petite Index” (GRAI) class of theory-based indicators that can be traced back to Kumar and Per-
saud (2002).  
These intuitive indicators are ultimately based on the modeling assumption that the valuation of a 
risky asset already reflects an assessment of its riskiness at a given point in time. Accordingly, the 
indicators assume that the observation of a significant relationship between valuation changes and 
lagged measures of perceived riskiness (approximated by, for instance, historical variances) for a 
given cross-section of risky assets is attributable to a change of investors’ general risk appetite. 
However, when implementing such an indicator, the choice of which financial market segments to 
cover in terms of assets is just one of several decisions to be made. Here, we concentrate on the 
results obtained for two data sets: a set of international stock market indices and a merged set that 
includes bond indices in addition to the stock market indices. The paper then explores for each data 
set how the indicator results are shaped by the various implementation decisions. On this basis, we 
then select that combination of options along the dimensions of implementation decisions which we 
expect to lead to the overall best empirical performance of the resulting indicators with respect to 
certain plausibility and consistency criteria. 
For the financial market turmoil period beginning in mid-2007, in particular the equity-only GRAIs 
strongly benefit from applying a combination of the Kumar and Persaud (2002) rank correlation ap-
proach and a modified version of the Misina (2006) factor-transformation extension. We also find  
 
that the merged-set GRAIs are more closely correlated with the corresponding equity-only GRAIs 
than with the bond-only GRAIs. This is consistent with the notion of a special role for equity markets 
when evaluating the overall situation in financial markets.  
The extent to which investor assessments of (derivative) assets’ riskiness are likely to change over 
the valuation period matters not just in terms of internal consistency considerations but also for the 
interpretation of significant GRAI results. Intuitively, for a weak relationship between changes in the 
assessments of (derivative) assets’ riskiness over a valuation period and beginning-of-period riski-
ness assessments, for instance, it seems more likely that a significant GRAI result which suggests 
a decline in investors’ aggregate risk appetite will do so not only in a broader, but to some extent 
also in a narrower sense. In our analyses, the preferred rank-correlation GRAIs with the modified 
factor-transformation extension perform more favorably is this respect, too. Furthermore, in their 
case there is also some empirical support for the notion that what occurred in financial markets at 
the onset of the turmoil in mid-2007 was connected at least to some extent with a decline in general 
risk appetite in a narrower sense.  
The two ready-to-implement indicators – one for stock markets alone, one for stock and bond mar-
kets combined – are, however, only one result of the present paper. Its most important result is the 
insight how heavily dependent the outcomes obtained for the chosen risk appetite indicator concept 
are on technical implementation decisions, though. It is absolutely necessary to take this into ac-




Veränderungen in der allgemeinen Bereitschaft von Investoren zur Risikoübernahme sind ein wich-
tiger Faktor bei einer Analyse der Entwicklungen und der Stabilitätslage in Finanzmärkten. Ange-
sichts der sich daraus ergebenden Notwendigkeit zur Quantifizierung wurden in der Literatur eine 
Reihe von Risikoappetit- bzw. Risikoaversionsindikatoren vorgeschlagen. Vergleicht man jedoch 
die Ergebnisse, die die Indikatoren liefern, so unterscheiden sie sich häufig in Bezug auf die 
Schlussfolgerungen (siehe Illing und Aaron (2005)). Allerdings ist zu berücksichtigen, dass die Indi-
katoren vielfach auch in wichtigen Aspekten differieren. Dazu gehört die zugrunde liegende Ab-
grenzung der Risikoübernahmebereitschaft bzw. des ‚Risikoappetits’ von Investoren auf aggregier-
ter Ebene. So genannte theoriebasierte Indikatoren zielen zum Beispiel auf eine eher engere Defi-
nition. Sie versuchen, die aus Veränderungen in der Risikoübernahmebereitschaft resultierenden 
Effekte auf die relative Nachfrage nach risikobehafteten Assets von den Effekten, die aus veränder-
ten Einschätzungen der Risikograde der Assets resultieren, zu trennen. Dazu greifen sie auf Mo-
dellannahmen zurück. In welchem Ausmaß eine solche Trennung in empirischen Implementierun-
gen erreicht werden kann, hängt davon ab, inwieweit die jeweiligen Modellannahmen verletzt sind. 
Andere Indikatoren konzentrieren sich stattdessen einfach auf die in Marktdaten reflektierte Kombi-
nation beider Effekte. Von daher liegt ihnen ein eher breiter angelegtes Konzept von Risikoappetit 
zugrunde. Eine weitere Beobachtung ist, dass Indikatorergebnisse häufig auch nicht zu dem pas-
sen, was in Bezug auf die Risikoneigung in kritischen Finanzmarktperioden offensichtlich zu erwar-
ten wäre (siehe Illing und Aaron (2005)). Dies ist in Bezug auf Plausibilität und Nützlichkeit ein noch 
offensichtlicheres Problem. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, inwieweit sich ein besseres Ver-
ständnis dafür, wie ein Indikator konkret funktioniert, für Verbesserungen nutzen lässt. Diesbezüg-
lich konzentrieren wir uns auf die beliebte, auf Kumar und Persaud (2002) zurückgehende so ge-
nannte Global Risk Appetite Index (GRAI) Klasse von theoriebasierten Indikatoren.  
Diese intuitiven Indikatoren basieren letztlich auf der Annahme, dass die Bewertung eines risikobe-
hafteten Assets die zu dem entsprechenden Zeitpunkt vorliegende Einschätzung seines Risikogra-
des bereits reflektiert. Darauf aufbauend unterstellen die Indikatoren, dass für eine Gruppe risiko-
behafteter Assets die Beobachtung einer signifikanten Querschnittsbeziehung zwischen ihren je-
weiligen aktuellen Bewertungsänderungen und früheren Einschätzungen ihrer Risikograde (appro-
ximiert zum Beispiel mit Hilfe von historischen Varianzen) auf eine Veränderung des allgemeinen 
Risikoappetits von Investoren zurückzuführen ist. Abgesehen davon, welche Finanzmarktsegmente 
durch entsprechende Assets abgedeckt werden, sind bei der Implementierung von solchen Indika-
toren allerdings noch eine Reihe weiterer Entscheidungen zu treffen. Bei der Konstruktion der Indi-
katoren konzentrieren wir uns dabei auf zwei Datensätze: zuerst allein auf eine Gruppe internatio-
naler Aktienmarktindizes, dann auf eine erweiterte Datenbasis, die neben den Aktienindizes auch 
Bondindizes umfasst. Die Studie analysiert anschließend, wie die für einen gegebenen Datensatz  
 
erzielten Indikatorergebnisse von den verschiedenen, bei der Implementierung getroffenen Ent-
scheidungen beeinflusst werden. Darauf aufbauend wird dann in Bezug auf die verschiedenen Ent-
scheidungsdimensionen diejenige Kombination von Optionen gewählt, für die nach Maßgabe be-
stimmter Plausibilitäts- und Konsistenzkriterien bei den resultierenden Indikatoren die insgesamt 
besten empirischen Ergebnissen erwartet werden.  
Für die Periode der Finanzmarktverspannungen ab Mitte 2007 zeigt sich dabei, dass insbesondere 
die Plausibilität der nur auf Basis der Aktienindizes abgeleiteten GRAIs von der Anwendung des 
Rangkorrelationsansatzes von Kumar und Persaud (2002) in Kombination mit einer modifizierten 
Version der von Misina (2006) vorgeschlagenen Faktortransformationserweiterung deutlich profi-
tiert. Außerdem beobachten wir, dass die auf Basis des erweiterten Datensatzes ermittelten GRAIs 
höher mit den entsprechenden GRAIs korreliert sind, die allein auf der Teilmenge der Aktienindizes 
basieren, als mit jenen, die sich für die Teilmenge der Bondindizes ergeben. Dies passt zu der Vor-
stellung, dass die Aktienmärkte wahrscheinlich eine besondere Rolle spielen dürften, wenn es um 
eine Einschätzung der Gesamtlage an den Finanzmärkten geht.  
Abgesehen von Überlegungen zur internen Konsistenz des Ansatzes spielt die Frage, in welchem 
Ausmaß sich die Einschätzungen der Investoren bezüglich der Risikograde von (abgeleiteten) As-
sets im Verlauf einer Periode verändern, für die Interpretation signifikanter GRAI-Ergebnisse eine 
Rolle. Rein intuitiv scheint es zum Beispiel bei einer schwachen Beziehung zwischen den Risiko-
einschätzungen der Assets am Anfang und deren Veränderungen im Verlauf der Periode wahr-
scheinlicher, dass ein signifikantes GRAI-Ergebnis gegebenenfalls einen Rückgang in der Risiko-
übernahmebereitschaft von Investoren nicht nur in einem breiteren, sondern auch in einem enge-
ren Sinne nahelegt. In dieser Hinsicht ergibt sich in unseren Analysen ebenfalls ein Vorteil für die 
präferierten GRAI-Implementierungen mit Rangkorrelationsansatz und modifizierter Faktortrans-
formationserweiterung. In deren Fall lässt sich zudem eine gewisse empirische Unterstützung für 
die Annahme finden, dass das, was in den Finanzmärkten bei Ausbruch der Turbulenzen Mitte 
2007 zu beobachten war, wenigstens teilweise mit einem Rückgang in der generellen Risiko-
übernahmebereitschaft im engeren Sinne verbunden war.  
Die zwei direkt anwendbaren Indikatoren – einer für Aktienmärkte allein, einer für Aktienmärkte und 
Bondmärkte zusammen – sind allerdings nur ein Ergebnis der vorliegenden Arbeit. Das wohl wich-
tigste Ergebnis der Arbeit ist jedoch die Erkenntnis, wie stark die Resultate für das gewählte Risi-
koappetitindikatorkonzept von technischen Implementierungsentscheidungen abhängen. Es ist 
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1. Introduction 
When reading a market report on how stocks fared relative to government bonds over the short run,  
one will often find that changes in investors’ general demand for risky assets relative to assets con-
sidered rather safe are not only attributed to changes in assets’ perceived riskiness1, but also to 
investors’ average or aggregate attitude towards risk2. Such changes in investors’ narrowly-defined 
appetite for/aversion to risk over time might not only affect the size of the compensation market 
participants require per unit of risk, but could also influence how markets react to shocks. Bad news 
in a market situation where investor risk appetite is already low is likely to result in a much larger re-
pricing of risky assets than in periods where it is high. The dynamic stance of the risk appetite of 
market participants as a sentiment could thus serve as an important contributing factor in the trans-
mission of shocks through the financial system. Furthermore, as it might itself be influenced by the 
situation in financial markets, it could work as a multiplier. Accordingly, taking into account the risk 
appetite/risk aversion of investors and its evolution has become an important element of assessing 
the condition and stability of financial markets.  
A number of indicators have therefore been proposed in the literature for quantifying the evolution 
of investors’ general risk appetite (for an overview see e.g. Illing and Aaron (2005)). Some of them 
are based on theoretical models, while others are more atheoretic or adhoc in the sense that they 
only aggregate the information contained in market data without relying on a theoretical framework. 
But the notion of risk appetite underlying these indicators is not necessarily identical. Under a nar-
row interpretation of risk appetite, one faces the difficulty of having to disentangle the effects of 
changes in investors’ risk appetite on investors’ relative demand for risky assets from those of 
changes in risk assessments. For this, one can try to rely on certain modeling assumptions when 
developing indicators. Alternatively, one may choose to circumvent the problem by simply focusing 
on the combined effects reflected in changes of the relative demand for risky assets. This leads to 
indicators for a more broadly-defined concept of risk appetite. Finally, in theory the stance of inves-
tors’ general risk appetite is likely to affect all risky financial market segments. In terms of actual 
results, however, the fact that the various risk appetite indicators often vary in their coverage of 
financial market segments is another potential source of heterogeneity.   
                                                  
1 In a stochastic environment, a priori the total return on an initial investment will in general be uncertain and subject to 
various kinds of risk, such as e.g. market risk, liquidity risk, and default risk. Assuming that changes along such risk di-
mensions lead to an immediate re-pricing of assets in financial markets, in the following sections the asset (return) riski-
ness measure of interest will be based on variances respectively covariances of (relatively short-term) realized asset 
returns.  
2 Traditionally, models often assume that the fundamental degree of risk aversion of an individual investor is a character-
istic parameter that remains constant. But this does not preclude a change at the aggregate (cross-section) level if e.g. 
investors are not all identical, but instead characterized by different individual degrees of aversion to risk and the compo-
sition of investors actively participating in the markets changes over time, see Kumar and Persaud (2002). Furthermore, 
the behavioral finance theory argues that the degree of risk aversion of an individual investor may also change over time 
depending on previous investment decisions’ outcomes. Thus, a row of positive results might lead to overconfidence of 
an investor and lower aversion to taking on risk, while the opposite may happen after significant losses.  
  - 2 -
It is therefore maybe not altogether surprising that the different indicators do not always suggest a 
similar stance of investors’ risk appetite. What is even more problematic, it might not always be one 
that coincides well with given priors around critical periods in financial markets (see e.g. Illing and 
Aaron (2005)). Such findings raise concern about the usefulness of applying risk appetite indicators 
in the first place. A better understanding of how individual indicators work thus seems clearly war-
ranted and might offer ways of potential improvement down the road. The paper contributes to this 
evolution, concentrating on the “Global Risk Appetite Index” (GRAI) class of indicators.  
This indicator concept, developed originally by Kumar and Persaud (2002), rests on the assumption 
that at a given point in time the price of a risky asset will already reflect an assessment of its risk. 
The authors assume that a significant monotonic relationship between excess returns and past 
measures of perceived riskiness for a cross-section of risky assets should then only be observed if 
market participants’ aggregate risk appetite has changed. Focusing on the foreign exchange mar-
ket segment, Kumar and Persaud (2002) assess the significance of risk appetite changes using 
cross-sectional Spearman rank correlation coefficients between monthly or quarterly excess returns 
of assets and assets’ past volatilities.3 Wilmot, Mielczarski et al. (2004) and Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2005) instead assume linear relationships between excess returns and past riskiness. Further-
more, they apply a linear-regression indicator approach to data from not only one financial market 
segment at a time, but consider stock and bond markets together. To emphasize investors’ aggre-
gate risk aversion as the dual concept to risk appetite, finally Coudert and Gex (2006) choose to 
define their linear Global Risk Aversion Index as the negative of the cross-sectional linear correla-
tion between excess returns of assets and past volatilities.4  
Its intuitiveness and simplicity makes the GRAI class a popular choice among the theory-based risk 
appetite indicators. The ability to cover a larger cross-section of indices from several financial mar-
ket segments in an integrated way is another attractive feature. One also has to keep in mind some 
caveats, though. Despite having a similar model in mind, (G)RAI indicator results in the end will 
also depend on certain specification and input choices. This concerns the choice between a merely 
monotonic or a more restrictive linear relation between assets’ excess returns and measures of 
riskiness, the selection of assets/financial market segments, the length of the period over which to 
calculate the respective (excess) returns, and how to proxy for riskiness as perceived by investors. 
For the latter, a common practice in the literature is to rely on volatilities respectively variances of 
individual asset returns. However, in a portfolio context, this effectively amounts to assuming that 
                                                  
3 They applied their indicator to specific segments of financial markets, primarily the FX market, but also to the US stock 
market where they looked at a cross-section of US sector equity indices. For details, see Kumar and Persaud (2002), p. 
414. To avoid any overlap of the period over which volatilities and returns were calculated, the volatilities were derived for 
a period of 250 business days prior to the excess return period. 
4 For their linear correlation-based index they used the abbreviation GRAI, while the negative corresponding cross-
sectional regression coefficient was dubbed Risk Aversion Index (RAI). They applied the indicators to two sets of cross-
sectional data (one of foreign exchange rates, and another of international stock indices) separately like Kumar and Per-
saud (2002), however, they used a lower frequency of monthly instead of daily data.   
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covariances between asset returns do not significantly contribute to the riskiness of assets5. Misina 
(2006) therefore suggests taking the full variance-covariance (VCV) matrix of asset returns into 
account in his extended factor-based rank-correlation risk appetite indicator, called RAI-MI. Since 
he wanted to compare results of his RAI-MI with the preferred indicator of Kumar and Persaud 
(2002), however, he focused on international FX markets in his paper.   
The current paper broadens the investigation into the relative pros and cons of the Misina factor-
extension, as well as the necessary other choices to be made when deriving a GRAI-type risk aver-
sion indicator. However, we introduce an important additional restriction to the Misina (2006) factor 
extension, which leads to our modified version of the factor-extended rank-correlation Global Risk 
Aversion Index (F-GRAI).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a short presentation 
of the theoretical background to the GRAI class of risk appetite indicators. Section 3 then moves to 
the empirical analysis of the GRAIs as global risk aversion indicators, where in terms of financial 
market coverage we focus first on international stock markets and later on stock and bond markets 
combined. The recent stressful phase of financial market turmoil from mid-2007 onwards will serve 
as an important yardstick for evaluating the plausibility of results and how that is affected by the 
factor-extension as well as the other implementation decisions.6 Finally, section 4 will summarize 
the main results.  
2. Methodology: The GRAI Indicator – Theoretical Motivation and the Misina Critique  
Apart from adding the assumption that “investors have the same, but changing risk appetite”, 
Kumar and Persaud (2002) in principle rely on a simplified capital asset pricing model (CAPM)7 for 
theoretically motivating their indicator’s key hypotheses. These are that a rank correlation between 
a cross-section of asset price movements at time t and the assets’ riskiness at t-m should be weak 
for a contemporary change in general risk, but that it should be strong for a change in the general 
appetite for risk. With some measure of volatility as a proxy of asset riskiness, they then used the 
rank correlation between asset excess returns and past volatilities from the beginning of the return 
period as their risk appetite indicator. 
Under the usual assumptions of the CAPM, the expected return of a risky asset i in period t+1, 
1 ()
i
t ER , in equilibrium should exceed the risk-free rate  1
f
t R  by a risk premium (excess return) 
                                                  
5 In the portfolio context that might be used to motivate the GRAI class of indicators theoretically, asset returns’ covari-
ances will be zero in the case of independence, see also Coudert and Gex (2006).  
6 Of course, another interesting empirical question in terms of the usefulness of a risk appetite indicator might be to ex-
plore whether factors that are considered influential for the evolution of investors’ risk appetite, like e.g. the degree of 
liquidity in financial markets, can be related to the dynamic evolution of investors’ aggregate risk appetite over time. See 
e.g. also ECB (2007a). 
7 For details on their simplified version of a CAPM, see Kumar and Persaud (2002), p. 409ff. However, the CAPM model 
used in the following is closer to e.g. Coudert and Gex (2006).   
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equal to the representative investor’s degree of risk-aversion   times the asset’s systematic risk. 
Since the latter is determined by how the asset return co-varies with the return  1
M
t R  of the market 
portfolio, this leads to the familiar equation: 
(1)          11 1 1 , () c o v (,)
if i M
tt t t i M ER R R R . 
A portfolio return is the sum of the returns on the portfolio’s individual assets times their given port-




RR , with     1 i
i
. The covariance  , iM can thus be re-written 
as 
(2)                   

      
22
,1 1 1 1 1 cov( , ) , with  var( ) and  cov( , )
iM i ij
iM t t i i j i j i t i j t t
ji
RR R RR  
and substituted into (1) in order to obtain   
(3) 
2
,1 1 1 , ()( )() ( )
ex ex i f
ii tt t i M i i j i j
ji
ER ER ER R        

          . 
A change in expected excess returns can then arise from a change in risk aversion or a change in 
the riskiness of asset i stemming either from a change in its own return variance or changes in its 
































According to (4), an autonomous change in the degree of risk aversion  should thus lead to a 
change of asset excess returns in proportion to their riskiness  , iM,  













Within the model, a change in risk aversion should therefore be accompanied by a significant corre-
lation between asset excess returns and their riskiness. However, for an empirically feasible GRAI 
indicator, observable proxies must be substituted for the quantities on both sides of (5). Changes in 
expected asset returns are thus replaced by short-term realized (i.e. ex-post) returns defined in 
terms of observed changes in log asset prices.8 The practice of approximating asset return riski-
ness by own past volatilities respectively variances only, like in Kumar and Persaud (2002), may 
                                                  
8 Under the assumption that any re-pricing of assets to effect a change in risk premia takes place immediately at time t 
while expectations concerning future asset values remain unchanged, one obtains   (( ) )
ex i
it dER d P. See e.g. also 
Coudert and Gex (2006).  
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lead to a different ranking of assets in terms of riskiness than if one considered the covariances 
with the market portfolio, though. As shown by equation (2), only for covariances between the indi-
vidual asset returns equal to zero and asset weights either equally large or increasing with the as-
set return variances it would be guaranteed that both approaches lead to the same asset return 
riskiness rankings. Misina (2003) argues, however, that the independence of asset returns has a 
further benefit when applying the GRAI. For independent returns, a common shock to the riskiness 
of all assets can – with given weights – only occur through a simultaneous increase or decrease of 
all variances. In that case, a rank correlation effect between assets’ excess returns and their past 
variances could a priori not be excluded, unless one assumed equally weighted portfolios (see 
Misina (2003), p. 15-16). However, when returns are not independent, also a change in the covari-
ance between two asset returns could lead to a rank correlation effect – again unless assets were 
assumed to have equal weights (see Misina (2003), p. 13ff). 
This shows that assumptions concerning the weights and the independence of asset returns are 
important for nesting the empirical GRAI approach of Kumar and Persaud (2002) within the theo-
retical portfolio context of a CAPM. When returns are not independent, Misina (2006) proposes as a 
pragmatic solution to use an eigenvalue/eigenvector decomposition of the variance-covariance 
(VCV) matrix of asset returns to transform the original GRAI rank correlation problem into one con-
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the VCV matrix is decomposed into     R BDB, with D the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues (or-
dered from largest to smallest, i.e.      1 ii jj DD ij n ) and B the matrix of the corresponding 
normalized eigenvectors (in columns). The inverse of B can then be used to obtain orthogonal fac-
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Misina (2006) argues that the factors can be interpreted as returns on derivative assets constructed 
from the range of original assets (see there, p. 9) and proposes to take the correlation between the  
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ranks of the orthogonal factors and the ranks of their variances (i.e. the ranks of the already or-
dered diagonal elements of D) as an alternative to the Kumar and Persaud (2002) indicator.9  
Unlike argued by Misina, however, the normalization of eigenvectors alone cannot guarantee to 
avoid problems of non-uniqueness as normalization only enforces the restriction that the sum of 
squared elements of an eigenvector must add to one (i.e. that the eigenvector will have unit length). 
This still leaves the problem that multiplying all elements of a normalized eigenvector by -1 will 
again result in a valid normalized eigenvector. Therefore, we will ensure fully unique eigenvectors 
in B by conducting a “normalization-plus”. This imposes the additional restriction that the sum of the 
elements of each normalized eigenvector must be non-negative.10  
The factor extension is not a perfect solution. Again it depends on the (now transformed) weights 
   whether the rankings of factors in terms of true riskiness might be different from the one ob-
tained based on factor variances alone. The problem of potentially observing a correlation effect 
between the ranks of factors and the ranks of their (lagged) riskiness proxies which might in fact be 
unrelated to changes in risk aversion is also not fully eliminated.11 Another empirically relevant as-
pect is that the orthogonality of derived factors will to some extent be violated as VCV matrices of 
asset returns change over time. Such caveats must be taken into account and one has to acknowl-
edge the assumptions implicitly made when applying the factor-extended rank-correlation GRAI. In 
the end, though, the main question is the usefulness of the factor extension when actually applying 
the GRAI approach. This we will explore in the following empirical section. 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Data and Indicator Inputs  
The first data set for which risk-appetite indicators are calculated consists of a selection of MSCI 
developed and emerging stock market indices (for details see table 1 in the appendix), with the sec-
ondary rate on 3-month US Treasury Bills used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. (End-of-) Wednes-
day observations of the data are chosen to calculate the risk-appetite indicators at a weekly fre-
                                                  
9 One could formulate an equilibrium relationship corresponding to (1) between expected returns and riskiness for the 
factors, i.e.          11 ()
f
tt Ef R DB D . As argued by Misina (2006), due to an identical profile of (ex-
pected) risk over (expected) return, investors should be indifferent between holding a portfolio of original assets with 
weights  or a corresponding portfolio of derivative assets with the weights B . But the CAPM model for the factors 
as derivative assets is not identical to the one for the original assets, as one can see when pre-multiplying (6) by 
1 B .  
10 This assumption is plausible also from a theoretical point of view: for the factor CAPM model (see footnote 9) with 
equally large positive elements in   this restriction guarantees that also the new weights      B  will at least all be 
positive. 
11 The potential for a rank correlation effect after a common shock to the factor variances now depends on the asset 
weights in the original portfolio and the elements of B. Furthermore, even for a constant weight vector   with equal-sized 
elements for the original portfolio of assets, the weights in the CAPM formulated for the factors,      B , are likely to 
be affected by changes of B, e.g. if the covariances between the original dependent asset returns change over time.   
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quency.12 A second data set of Merrill Lynch indices (for details see table 3 in the appendix) covers 
the bond market segment. In addition to a US government bond index as a relatively safe asset it 
includes indices for investment-grade US corporate bonds of different sector/rating segments, high 
yield bonds, ABS, and non-investment grade emerging market bonds of different rating segments.  
Implementing the GRAI with stock index data has the advantage that they refer to comparable and 
liquid instruments. Since the stock market is considered to provide aggregate information on the 
stance of the real economy, it is also likely to react to any major shock that affects the economy or 
more narrowly the financial system from the outside. Accordingly, equity markets typically play a 
prominent role when gauging the general risk appetite stance of investors.  
Furthermore, despite the assumption that a change in investors’ general risk appetite should lead to 
a re-pricing of risky assets across a number of market segments, there might also be some element 
of idiosyncrasy in the appetite for specific asset classes’ risk at a given point in time. That is to say, 
one important empirical question is how informative the changes in risk appetite implied for one 
segment of financial markets are for the common or general risk appetite stance indicated when 
considering different financial market segments simultaneously. Given the implications of the sub-
prime crisis in mid-2007, it therefore seems particularly interesting to compare the stock market 
GRAI with results for data sets covering only or in addition different bond indices. Combined data 
sets of stock and bond indices were also used in Wilmot, Mielczarski et al. (2004) and Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2005). However, they looked at cross-sectional linear regressions between asset ex-
cess returns and past risk measures. Thus, one focus of the present paper is to compare the re-
sults obtained under a more restrictive linear (RAI) approach with those from the less restrictive 
rank-correlation GRAI approach.  
There exist arguments both for and against considering different asset classes together when it 
comes to developing risk appetite indicators. On the one hand, a larger cross-section of assets with 
different degrees of riskiness should, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in efficiency.13 On the 
other hand, assets from different asset classes will be subject to different kinds of risk. From an 
investor’s point of view, these kinds of risk might be more or less important at different times. The 
recent subprime crisis, for instance, quickly put credit and liquidity risk aspects very high on inves-
tors’ worry list. When applying the GRAI indicator to a broad cross-segment portfolio, a cross-
sectional averaging effect might therefore lead to the loss of information on the risk stance towards 
                                                  
12 Daily data of the MSCI indices (all with the USD as the reference currency) were taken from MSCI/Bloomberg, while 
the data for treasury bill rates were downloaded from the FRED website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 









t rf  assuming 52 weeks per year, see also Bollerslev, Engle et al. (1988). Proxies for 
the risk free rates corresponding to alternative return periods can be obtained accordingly.   
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more specific asset classes. Furthermore, the factorization already adds another level of complex-
ity. Expanding the data set thus might be a greater challenge to the robustness of results in the 
F-GRAI case. The F-GRAI also has by construction a broader range of riskiness degrees covered, 
it exploits the information concerning the original assets’ riskiness more efficiently.14 In particular for 
the F-GRAI it might therefore a priori not be clear whether to prefer an integrated or disaggregated 
approach. 
Apart from the choice of assets to be included in the data set, one has to make four additional cen-
tral decisions to actually obtain a (G)RAI type risk appetite indicator empirically.  
The first decision is how and over what length of period to calculate the (excess) returns of the as-
sets. For the following empirical applications, the asset returns of interest are the log index 
changes. More precisely, the return on index i at time t is calculated as the difference between the 
log index values at time t and some previous time t-m, with the lag m corresponding to the chosen 
return period length. Excess returns are then derived by subtracting the risk-free rate for a corre-
sponding period of length m at time t-m.  
Price or valuation changes of opposite directions observed from day to day or even week to week 
may average out to some extent over time. On the other hand, the cumulative impact of a row of 
weekly changes in the same direction is more visible if returns are calculated over a longer period. 
The pattern of returns thus becomes smoother and more distinguishable for longer return periods 
(see also figure 1 in the appendix). Accordingly, quarterly returns or even 6-month returns are often 
preferred when implementing a (G)RAI type of risk appetite indicator, since a smoother GRAI 
seems easier to interpret (see e.g. also Coudert and Gex (2006) and Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2005)). Unless otherwise noted, we therefore focus on the (G)RAI results obtained for a longer 
return period of 12 weeks. 
A second decision has to be made regarding how to proxy for assets’ riskiness. This holds true 
even when deciding to use lagged asset return variances (i.e., variances calculated at time t-m) as 
proxies as in the empirical GRAI literature. Intuitively, a 12-week return period might suggest con-
sidering the lagged variances of 12-week asset/index returns as well. However, to calculate the 
variance of 12-week returns from non-overlapping observations, one would need at least 7-9 years 
of data (30-39 observations). While this is the statistically correct approach, once one allows for 
changing variances, one may question whether such a measure in which current developments can 
have only a minimal impact serves as a good proxy for an asset’s riskiness as perceived by real-life 
investors. Therefore, the GRAI literature typically considers a much shorter window of asset return 
                                                                                                                                                                
13 Kumar and Persaud (2002), p. 413, suggest using as many asset returns and as long a history as possible in order to 
reduce the risk of a chance correlation between risks and returns.   
14 As argued in Wilmot, Mielczarski et al. (2004), their approach rests on the availability of a set of assets which differ 
sufficiently in terms of their degrees of riskiness. But via the factorization approach, one constructs derivative assets that  
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observations for calculating volatilities/variances. Kumar and Persaud (2002), for instance, use one 
year of daily data .  
In the current situation, one thus might decide to use the variance of weekly returns calculated for a 
short window of 52 weeks, but appropriately scaled to match the return-period length, as an alter-
native. While for a long-term portfolio investor a long-term risk concept seems more relevant, over 
the shorter-term periods of the GRAI context the scaled proxy certainly holds a particular appeal, 
too.15 Because a return over 12 weeks might be approximated by the sum of the 1-week returns 
over the respective 12 weeks, an alternative is to construct an approximate measure for the 12-
week return variance via a temporal aggregation approach.16 For estimating an approximate 12-
week return VCV matrix at time t, this approach takes into account the covariances between weekly 
returns at different lag lengths in addition to the most recent and lagged estimates of the VCV ma-
trix of weekly returns. The simple scaling of variances, on the other hand, focuses only on the most 
recent information regarding short-term asset return riskiness. A priori it is not clear which approach 
might be preferable in the current context. Hence we apply both the scaling and the temporal ag-
gregation approach to the construction of asset return variances and covariances. For the construc-
tion of the GRAIs, the estimated variances and VCV matrices of asset returns are then appropri-
ately lagged to avoid any overlap with the period over which the cross-section of asset excess re-
turns is calculated.  
As argued above, though, even when assuming equal portfolio weights for the different assets, the 
riskiness of asset returns does not only depend on asset returns’ own variances, but also on their 
covariances. While Misina (2006) suggests deriving factors from dependent asset returns and an 
eigen decomposition of the asset return VCV matrix, the true VCV matrix is unknown and may even 
change over time. Accordingly, the historical VCV matrix calculated at time t-m is used as an ap-
propriately lagged, but ex post necessarily imperfect estimate in the factorization step. This implies, 
however, that the factor portfolio returns actually realized for time t are no longer guaranteed to be 
independent by construction. However, one can still expect that the problem of dependence be-
tween returns is smaller with than without the factorization adjustment.  
Based on the decomposition of the lagged asset return VCV matrix estimate     R BDB (with B 
the matrix of “normalized-plus” eigenvectors in columns), the factors corresponding to the observed 
original asset returns at time t are thus calculated as  
                                                                                                                                                                
cover a much broader range of riskiness degrees (in terms of the difference between maximum and minimum riskiness) 
than the original range of assets.  
15 Furthermore, if changes in the implied or revealed risk appetite behavior of investors at least partly reflect the changes 
in the riskiness seen over a shorter period, longer-term measures of variances – while being less-variable proxies – might 
also not resolve the real identification issue of capturing the evolution of riskiness as perceived by the average investor 
concerned. 
16 See in this context e.g. also Brandt (2008), p. 16.     























As in Misina (2006), the correlation between the ranks of the factors and the ranks of their lagged 
variances (i.e. the respective diagonal elements of the matrix D) is then used for the factor-based 
GRAI indicator.  
However, this step actually involves another decision, namely whether to calculate the risk appetite 
or aversion indicator assuming a linear or a monotonic relationship between the cross-section of 
asset excess returns at some time t and appropriately lagged past measures of their riskiness. The 
former corresponds to a linear cross-sectional correlation or regression approach, the latter to the 
Spearman rank correlation approach of Kumar and Persaud (2002) (see also Misina (2006), p. 5). 
In the following presentation of empirical results GRAI stands for a rank correlation indicator and 
RAI for the linear RAI indicator, either as a linear correlation (RAI-C) or linear regression version 
(RAI-R). The usage of asset excess returns or factor returns, if not otherwise noted, is indicated by 
adding a preceding R- or F-  to the indicator abbreviation. To emphasize the dual concept of 
changes in risk aversion rather than risk appetite, the respective cross-sectional regression or cor-
relation coefficient estimates are multiplied by -1 so that positive values correspond to increases in 
risk aversion (see Coudert and Gex (2006)). Our (G)RAIs therefore represent global risk aversion 
indicators. 
Figure 2 in the appendix compares the variance proxies for the 12-week MSCI US and Indonesia 
index returns with those of the first factor(s) obtained for the corresponding setups.17 Since the fac-
tor variances are obtained as the ordered eigenvalues of a VCV decomposition, the variance of 
factor 1 must always be larger than that of factor 2. This difference in magnitudes (together with the 
different scales of factor returns) has important implications when applying the linear regres-
sion/correlation RAI indicators instead of the rank-correlation GRAI approach to a cross-section of 
factors and their variances. For a linear F-RAI indicator, the values will often be almost identical to 
the negative of the first factor’s ratio of excess returns to variance, as the first factor is dominating 
by construction and the linear model’s results tend to be strongly affected by large outliers.18 This 
suggests that a combination of the factorization extension together with the rank correlation ap-
proach of the GRAI might be more promising to obtain an indicator for assessing an average risk 
aversion stance of investors.   
                                                  
17 Note that the factors are not directly comparable coming from different factorizations under the two setups. 
18 Intuitively, the first factor represents the factor portfolio of underlying assets with the maximum variance. The larger the 
cross-section of risky assets across which one can aggregate in the risk dimension, the larger is this maximum factor 
variance likely to be relative to the minimum factor variance.   
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3.2. Equity-Only (G)RAI Results    
Since both the original Kumar and Persaud (2002) and the factor-extended indicator proposed by 
Misina (2006) are of the rank-correlation type, it seems natural to focus in particular on the GRAIs 
in the following discussion of indicator results.  
One reasonable assumption is that times of higher stress in financial markets are more likely to be 
associated with decreasing than increasing risk appetite at the aggregate level. This suggests that 
for a plausibility check of the indicator results one might want to look in particular at their behavior 
during such periods. Some periods of likely higher financial market stress are therefore highlighted 
in the indicator graphs in the appendix. The exact dating of these periods is given in table 2 of the 
appendix. For the most part it closely follows González-Hermosillo (2008). Apart from small adjust-
ments due to the weekly frequency of the current analysis, only in two cases did it seem advisable 
to deviate from the choices made by González-Hermosillo (2008). The first deviation concerns the 
beginning of the stress episode following September 11, 2001, where for the purposes of this study 
the highlighted period starts on September 12, 2001.19 Furthermore, the end date for the US sub-
prime mortgage and ensuing liquidity squeeze episode was left open, since –  as also noted by 
González-Hermosillo (2008) – the crisis was clearly still ongoing at the end of the sample period 
used for the following analysis (March 12, 2008). Of course, the non-statistical method of dating 
these periods implies that there is a certain degree of discretion involved, in particular in terms of 
choosing the pre-crisis part of the highlighted periods.20 Furthermore, longer-term cyclical dynamics 
which overlay shorter-term dynamics in financial markets likely also contribute to the evolution of 
investors’ general risk appetite.  
In addition, some of the figures in the appendix also include horizontal lines corresponding to the 
critical values for a two-sided significance test of the rank correlation at a 5% significance level (for 
the critical values see Zar (1972)).    
Overall, the graphs of the GRAI indicators for 12-week factor returns in figure 3 of the appendix 
appear more in line with priors concerning changes in risk appetite/aversion around critical periods 
than the results based on the original 12-week index returns. Despite the 12-week return periods, 
the GRAI patterns still retain a certain volatility. However, in all of the highlighted periods the 
F-GRAIs are either already in the positive domain or start a noticeable increase after the actual 
crisis event. At first sight the crisis episode of the Ford and GM downgrades (no. 8) appears to be 
different in this respect. The F-GRAIs drop immediately after the crisis event date given in 
González-Hermosillo (2008), namely March 16, 2005 when Moody’s announced their intention of 
reviewing the credit rating of GM. However, the crisis episode actually was played out over a pro-
                                                  
19 González-Hermosillo (2008), on the other hand, chose a later date for her analysis, as certain markets were closed for 
a few days. 
20 Alternatively, one may choose a more statistical approach of directly dating such crises. Coudert and Gex (2006) e.g. 
used the CMAX indicator of Patel and Sarkar (1998) for the dating of stock market crises.  
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tracted period and in different phases.21 In fact, the problems of Ford and GM already started to 
become more and more obvious in late 2004.22 The F-GRAIs seem better than the R-GRAIs at 
capturing this by moving from a significantly negative territory associated with still increasing risk 
appetite into a stance of eventually even increasing risk aversion. The initial increase is much more 
pronounced for the F-GRAI calculated from the lagged scaled VCV matrices of weekly returns than 
for the F-GRAI derived from temporally aggregated (co-)variances of asset returns, though.23  
One potential explanation why the F-GRAIs might be more affected than the R-GRAIs by the 
choice of calculating the (co-)variances as either a very short-term risk measure or a risk measure 
for a medium-term period could be that for the F-GRAIs it does not only influence the risk rankings 
of assets. Due to the factorization of the corresponding VCV matrices it also has implications for the 
composition of the factors as portfolios of the underlying original assets. While the first factor is 
constructed to have a higher riskiness – read variance – than the other factors, in the first case it 
will be constructed to exhibit the highest short-term riskiness of all factors. In the second case, 
however, it will rank higher than the remaining factors in terms of medium-term risk. Thus, for the 
F-GRAIs the difference in the variance-covariance calculation translates into a different composition 
of the factors as derivative assets. This might lead to a slightly more dissimilar pattern for the 
F-GRAIs than for the R-GRAIs across the two methods of deriving riskiness proxies.24 
While there is some similarity in the graphs of the indicators, the choice of factor returns instead of 
the original asset returns seems to have a clear impact on the results. One interesting period in this 
respect is early 1998, before the outbreak of the Russian crisis. Unlike the R-GRAIs, the F-GRAIs 
suggest at least a short period of significantly increasing risk appetite for early 1998, i.e. in the 
wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997.25 For the stock market downturn in 2002, the F-GRAIs – 
in contrast to the R-GRAIs – indicate significantly increasing risk aversion only at a later stage. This 
seems to fit in with the strongest stock market downturns occurring only in July and September of 
that year, though. Thirdly, after the crisis of the Ford and GM downgrades, only the F-GRAIs give a 
clearer suggestion of actually declining risk appetite after March 16, 2005.  
                                                  
21 With the GM earnings warning of March 16, 2005 and the subsequent further ratings revisions the crisis in the automo-
tive sector reached of course another level. However, already on October 14, 2004, the losses from auto sales in the US 
and the resulting worsening of earnings prospects had made headlines, with the S&P rating for GM subsequently being 
lowered to the lowest investment-grade level. The crisis in the US automotive sector thus developed over a longer time. 
And it reached another level of intensity when on October 8, 2005, the automotive parts company Delphi Corp., a former 
GM daughter, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
22 I.e., at the time the announcement for the review actually came, it might have not been such a shock for investors any-
more and their general risk appetite, while previously affected, might by that time temporarily have had a brief recovery.  
23 Although in both cases the F-GRAIs still fall short of crossing the upper critical value bound. So even for the F-GRAI 
based on weekly return (co-)variances one is not able to reject the null hypothesis of insignificance at the corresponding 
significance level (5% for a two-sided, 2.5% for an one-sided test).  
24 For the period Jan. 5, 2000 to March 12, 2008, the correlation between the 12-week GRAI indicators across the two 
methods of calculating the (co-)variances is approx. 0.71 between the F-GRAIs and 0.93 between the R-GRAIs.  
25 The R-GRAIs, on the other hand, remain in the positive domain, and as they are significant in early 1998, this suggests 
an increasing risk aversion at that time.  
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When comparing their overall patterns, the R-GRAIs appear at times more volatile and prone to 
very sharp corrections than the F-GRAIs. Before the Turkey crisis of 2006, the R-GRAIs still gave a 
strong indication that investors’ risk appetite was increasing. However, after the outbreak of the 
crisis the R-GRAIs again very significantly indicate a switch to increasing risk aversion. The F-GRAI 
changes take longer and are more muted, reaching a peak only towards the end of the highlighted 
period or even slightly later. Given the critical values, only for the F-GRAI based on temporally ag-
gregated (co-)variances is the implied increase in risk aversion weakly significant. But actually, 
concerning the timing of the increasing risk aversion as suggested by the F-GRAIs, one might also 
want to note another cause for concern around that time. Beginning in summer 2006, problems in 
the US housing market were more frequently mentioned.  
This brings the discussion to the evolution of the indicators during the most recent crisis, the US 
subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis of 2007 and 2008.26 Given the level of stress observed in 
financial markets at that time, it seems strange that all through the summer of 2007 the equity-
based R-GRAIs remain in the negative domain, thus giving no indication of an increasing risk aver-
sion around that time. The F-GRAIs, on the other hand, clearly suggest a decline of investor risk 
appetite after the outbreak of the crisis, and even point at a significant increase in investors’ general 
risk aversion stance around August/September 2007. This initial increase of the F-GRAI is even 
more pronounced and longer-lasting when based on temporally aggregated (co-)variances. In the 
latter case it was also matched by a stronger – and at the end of November/beginning of December 
2007 briefly significant – decline of risk aversion. However, early and mid December 2007 brought 
a return to increasing risk aversion as far as the F-GRAIs are concerned. Also the R-GRAIs sug-
gest a change to increasing risk aversion, but in their case the change appears less pronounced. 
From February 2008 onwards, the R-GRAIs tentatively suggest an increasing risk appetite again, 
while based on the F-GRAIs one arrives at the conclusion that investors’ risk aversion was overall 
still increasing. Looking at the end of the estimation period (mid-March 2008), only for the R-GRAI 
and the F-GRAI derived from temporally aggregated (co-)variances it is possible to reject the hy-
pothesis of zero rank correlation. However, while the F-GRAI would suggest significantly increasing 
risk aversion at that time, the R-GRAI suggests the opposite conclusion. In light of the markets’ 
worries about Bear Stearns during that period, this does not seem very likely. Considering the mag-
nitude of the recent crisis, the results for the equity-only F-GRAIs are more in line with intuition. The 
modified Misina extension for the GRAI thus seems empirically useful, as it delivers more plausible 
results for the sample of international stock market indices.  
                                                  
26 A more detailed view of this period is given in the third panel of figure 3, which covers only 2006 and later.  
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Robustness of GRAI Results to the Choice of Alternative Return Period Lengths  
Figure 4 in the appendix compares the GRAIs for 12-week returns with results obtained for 4-week 
and 24-week returns in order to explore the sensitivity of results to the return period length.27 The 
results clearly show that the averaging effect of longer return periods has both benefits and down-
sides. When comparing results for 24-week with those for 12-week return periods, it seems that the 
downsides outweigh the benefits for 24-week returns. This is not only visible in the behavior of the 
GRAI indicators during the latest crisis, but also to some extent after the 2006 crisis. While the 24-
week return R-GRAIs at least suggest a significant increase of risk aversion sometime in the sec-
ond half of 2006, the relatively long delay makes it somewhat difficult to see the direct connection to 
the crisis of 2006. Relative to the results for 24-week returns, the graphs of the 4-week return pe-
riod GRAI indicators appear more plausible. However, they are also more prone to strong correc-
tions from time to time. The averaging effect of longer return periods implies that one loses poten-
tially relevant information on short-term temporary effects on the stance of investors’ risk appetite 
changes. The GRAI indicators based on 12-week returns therefore reflect those changes only with 
a lag and/or in a much more muted fashion.  
For the stress period starting in the summer of 2007, the results for a 12-week return period sug-
gest a significant increase in investor risk aversion based on the F-GRAIs, but not for the R-GRAIs. 
For a 4-week return period, the F-GRAIs suggest that investor risk aversion has started to increase 
even slightly earlier (already during June 2007). However, the change after the crisis event appears 
less pronounced than for the 12-week return F-GRAIs. The 4-week return R-GRAIs, on the other 
hand, show a strong increase in indicator values after July 11, 2007. This indicates a shift to in-
creasing risk aversion between early August and early September.28 But the significantly negative 
values of the 4-week R-GRAIs from early-September until around mid- to late October 2007 sug-
gests that the earlier period of increasing risk aversion was followed by a temporary correction pe-
riod in which investor risk appetite started to increase again early on as well. Overall, the priors 
concerning the crisis effects on the confidence of investors are easier to reconcile with the graphs 
of the F-GRAIs than with the completely different scale of investor risk appetite recovery suggested 
by the 4-week return R-GRAIs. The tendency of sharp corrections for 4-week return GRAIs is also 
very visible after the 2006 crisis. While suggesting a significant increase in risk aversion right after 
the outbreak of the crisis, the 4-week R-GRAIs turn significantly negative even before the end of 
the highlighted stress period. Then, they temporarily shift back to being significantly positive again 
in September 2006. Balancing the trade-off between the information loss of longer and more vola-
                                                  
27 A corresponding 6-month period was e.g. used in Wilmot, Mielczarski et al. (2004) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2005). 
However, a shorter period of 1 month instead of the preferred quarterly returns was also applied in Kumar and Persaud 
(2002), to demonstrate its effect on the indicator.  
28 With the 4-week return R-GRAIs even being above the critical value for a short period of time in between, which sug-
gests a significant increase in risk aversion.   
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tile corrections with shorter return periods, 12-week return periods therefore appear to be a good 
compromise. In the following analyses they will be the preferred choice. 
Comparison of GRAIs with (Linear) RAI Results (12-week Return Period Length) 
If the relationship between excess returns and proxies for past riskiness is approximately linear and 
not only monotonic, then the rank correlation results should be similar to those of a linear correla-
tion approach (see also Misina (2006)). On the other hand, for a merely monotonic relationship the 
rank transformation should reduce the influence of extremes on estimating an aggregate or aver-
age relationship.  
The first factor clearly is an extreme case, as by construction it will always have the highest histori-
cal variance within the set of given factors. One might therefore expect that the distinction between 
the rank and simple linear correlation approach should matter in particular for the results obtained 
when using the factor extension. This is also demonstrated in figure 5 of the appendix. The more 
pronounced amplitudes of the RAI-C indicators relative to the GRAIs suggest that the correspond-
ing cross-sectional monotonic relationships exhibit some degree of non-linearity. This holds true  
even for the original asset returns. However, the difference in amplitudes – and thus the degree of 
the implied non-linearity – is much larger for the factor returns.  
While the correlation-based indicators have the benefit of naturally bounded outcomes, the linear 
regression RAI-R indicators seem more popular in the literature. But as the factor extension exac-
erbates the non-linearity problem, it leads to the obvious question to what extent factor-based 
RAI-R results might be driven by the first factor. Figure 6 in the appendix illustrates this problem. 
For the period of 2002 to 2007, the graph of the RAI-R indicator using factor returns almost exactly 
overlaps the graph of the negative of the return/variance ratio for the first factor alone. Accordingly, 
the large t-values for the factor-based RAI-R indicators should be read as a further indication of the 
problem of applying a linear approach to a cross-section of such factor returns. However, figure 6 
also suggests that the indicator implied by the first factor alone might be another valuable risk ap-
petite indicator – but with a different target group in mind. While the GRAI concentrates on the gen-
eral or average risk appetite of investors overall, the risk appetite indicator implied by the first factor 
alone is concerned with the risk compensation for the derivative asset with highest risk. Thus, it 
may be regarded as informative concerning the risk appetite/aversion changes of a hypothetical 
marginal investor only investing in portfolios of the highest risk. 
3.3. GRAIs – Extending the Coverage to Bond Market Segments  
This section extends the coverage of financial market segments to bond markets, which are repre-
sented by a sample of Merrill Lynch bond and ABS indices (for details see table 3 in the appendix). 
Using a 12-week return period, figure 7 compares the results for the GRAIs obtained for three data 
sets. For easier comparison, the results for the previous set of international stock indices are in- 
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cluded as a first case (Equity) in addition to the results for a second data set composed of corpo-
rate and ABS bond indices plus a US government bond index (Bonds/USG). Finally, the two sets 
are merged into a third set of international stock and bond indices (Eq/Bonds/USG). While figure 7 
covers the period from 2000 onwards, figure 8 is a snapshot of the period starting in 2006. 29   
The graphs support the notion that investor risk appetite changes are at times different for the vari-
ous market segments. However, the GRAIs for the merged set exhibit a greater degree of co-
movement with the GRAIs derived from the stock indices alone than with the respective bond-only 
indicators.30 The highest degree of correspondence between the respective GRAIs for the merged 
and the bond set is obtained when using the factor extension combined with scaled 1-week return 
VCV matrices.31 But as afore, the choice of how to calculate the respective (co-)variances has an 
overall larger impact on the F-GRAIs than on the R-GRAIs. This holds true for the bonds-only as 
well as the merged data set.32 
Focusing on the respective GRAI results before and during the latest financial stress period in fig-
ure 8, one observes a strong increase of the bond-only R-GRAIs already in May 2007. Given the 
lack of a significant increase in the equity-set R-GRAIs around that time, this can be interpreted as 
risk aversion having increased in the bond market segment first. As this is the financial market seg-
ment immediately affected by the subprime mortgage crisis, this is plausible. However for equity 
and bond markets combined, the merged-set R-GRAI still suggests a significantly increasing risk 
appetite around July 11, 2007. After a short period of significantly increasing risk aversion around 
mid- to end of August 2007, it again implies a significantly increasing risk appetite at the merged-
set level between October to mid-December 2007. However, considering the overall situation the 
earlier increase as well as the later less significant reduction of the merged-set F-GRAI altogether 
appear more in line with common intuition. The differences are less strong when one takes into 
account that the significant risk aversion changes implied by the merged-set R-GRAIs were to 
some degree balanced by significant changes of opposite sign after the outbreak of the latest crisis 
period. Nevertheless, overall the merged-set F-GRAIs are conservative in the sense that they less 
often suggest significant changes in investors’ risk appetite in the first place.  
                                                  
29 Apart from the highlighted periods of financial market stress, the figures also include the critical values for a two-sided 
significance test of the rank correlation at a 5% significance level for a cross-section of n=46 (i.e., for the merged set of 24 
international stock indices and 22 bond indices including the USG index). For the critical values see again Zar (1972). 
30 For scaled VCVs and 12-week return periods e.g., the correlation between equity-only and merged-set F-GRAIs (R-
GRAIs) in the period of Jan. 5, 2000 to March 12, 2008 is roughly 0.72 (0.78) versus 0.55 (0.42) between bond-only and 
merged-set F-GRAIs (R-GRAIs). 
31 For 12-week return periods, the correlation between the equity/bond/USG and bond/USG-only F-GRAIs (R-GRAIs) in 
the period of Jan. 5, 2000 to March 12, 2008 is approx. 0.55 (0.42) under the scaling approach versus 0.28 (0.47) under 
the temporal aggregation approach to calculating VCVs. 
32 The correlation between 12-week return period F-GRAIs (R-GRAIs) obtained with the two methods of calculating VCV 
matrices for the period of Jan. 5, 2000 to March 12, 2008 is roughly 0.46 (0.98) for the bonds/USG set and 0.67 (almost 
1) for the merged set.  
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The choice of indices always involves some discretion.  Due to its size and in general high degree 
of liquidity, the US government bond market plays a special role for international financial mar-
kets33. The reference bond data set therefore includes only an index for the US Treasuries, but no 
government bond index for another major developed country. Hence figure 9 in the appendix com-
pares the results obtained in the 2006 – 2008 period for merged sets slightly differing in terms of 
included government bond indices from developed countries.34 These small modifications, how-
ever, have only a negligible impact on the respective GRAI results. 
3.4. A Caveat – The GRAIs and the Role of Risk Ranking Stability  
Apart from the plausibility of results, an important criterion for judging indicators is the validity of 
core assumptions on which they are based. When constructing the GRAI for time t, it is conditional 
on the ranking of assets in terms of their return riskiness at the beginning of the m-week return pe-
riod, i.e. at time t-m. Thus, one implicitly makes the simplifying assumption that this initial risk rank-
ing of assets remains relevant to investors throughout the return period.35 However, investors may 
change their assessment of assets’ riskiness during the weeks of the return period, and the risk 
rankings of assets so most likely change as well. While the assumption is therefore likely to be vio-
lated to some extent, large violations obviously pose a problem. This holds true even if one is only 
interested in a broader risk appetite/aversion interpretation of the GRAI.36   
One might expect this problem to grow with the length of the return period. Furthermore, the factor 
extension of the GRAI adds another dimension of complexity. This is particularly relevant for larger 
cross-sections. Finally, also the use of the scaling or the temporal aggregation approach to calcu-
lating (co-)variances can matter. An analysis of the potential susceptibility of the different GRAI 
variants to large intra-period changes in risk rankings is thus warranted. It also seems useful as a 
further criterion by which to judge their relative merits.  
For the equity-only and combined-set F-/R-GRAIs, figures 11 to 13 in the appendix depict the 
maximum and minimum changes of (factor) asset variance ranks over the respective return period 
at each point in time, as well as the respective max-min spread. As expected, a longer return period 
is accompanied by larger max-min spreads of risk ranking changes. Furthermore, as illustrated by 
figure 14, the method of obtaining VCV matrices via scaling overall leads to smaller max-min 
                                                  
33 US Treasuries are also often referred to as a kind of “safe haven” asset for international investors in stressful times. 
34 Considering the combinations of USD valued government bond indices for the US, UK, Canada, plus in a second step, 
also Germany, Australia, and Japan; however, the case of including no government bond index is also considered. 
35 Misina (2006) argued that any additional conclusion respectively interpretation whether the GRAI might reflect changes 
in investors’ more narrowly defined fundamental degree of risk aversion was conditional on the likelihood of common 
shocks having occurred. As a proxy for the latter, he used the number of factors whose volatilities had changed in the 
same direction over the return period. The question of risk ranking stability considered here is of course related but still 
different, as it is concerned only with the question to what extent such changes of factor variances were so large as to 
have led to changes in (implied) risk rankings.  
36 The larger the extent to which the assumption seems violated, the more problematic it becomes to interpret the signals 
of significant GRAI values as indicating at least changes of a broadly-defined risk aversion stance of investors.  
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spreads of (derivative) asset risk rank changes than the temporal aggregation approach. This holds 
true in particular for the F-GRAI, but in general also for the R-GRAI. Accordingly, for the equity-only 
data set the F-GRAI has an advantage over the R-GRAI in terms of the risk ranking stability crite-
rion, in particular when using scaled covariances and 12- respectively 24-week return periods. For 
the merged data set, the evidence of a risk ranking stability advantage of the F-GRAI over the 
R-GRAI is more mixed as results depend on the combination of return period length and approach 
to calculating (co-)variances. However, with respect to overall risk ranking stability, the combination 
of F-GRAI with scaled VCV matrices and longer return periods remains the preferred choice also 
for the merged equity-bond data set.37  
3.5. A Correlation-Based Comparison with Alternative Indicators  
The number of risk appetite indicators presented in the literature is ample evidence of the lack of 
consensus on how to best assess the evolution of investors’ risk appetite respectively its changes. 
Nonetheless, under the assumption that the different indicators are all imperfect proxies for inves-
tors’ risk appetite/aversion changes, a principal component analysis (PCA) could be used to re-
cover a potential common component as the common information contained in the individual indica-
tors. However, when performing a PCA for nine market- and five theory-based risk appetite indica-
tors, the ECB (2007b) found that the first two principal components together were able to explain 
only about 56% of the overall variance of the indicators. They therefore concluded that “differences 
in methodologies and underlying data” represented too big a problem when trying to recover “a 
common component between several commonly followed [market-based and theory-based] indica-
tors” which could “explain large proportions of their variance”. Accordingly, they derived their com-
mon component risk appetite indicator only for the set of chosen market-based indicators. 
It is thus important to better understand to what extent these apparent differences between theory-
based and market-based indicators depend on decisions made when constructing the indicators. 
Accordingly, not only GRAIs but also corresponding RAI variants are included in the following com-
parison with four alternative market-based risk sentiment indicators. We follow the ECB (2007b) 
and exploit the dimension-reducing properties of a PCA on the set of alternatives, though. Table 4 
in the appendix presents the correlation coefficients for each of the equity-only and merged-set 
(G)RAI variants and the first principal component of the four alternative market-based indicators, 
                                                  
37 Figure 15 in the appendix also investigates whether a significant value of the GRAI coincides with a significant rank 
correlation between the asset/factor return variance changes over the return period and the past (i.e. beginning-of-period) 
variances. If there is a significant rank correlation between past variances and in-period variance changes with the same 
sign as the significant GRAI, one cannot exclude the possibility that the GRAI results might only reflect an adjustment of 
relative demand for riskier assets in response to the changes in the risk dimension, but not necessarily changes in the risk 
appetite/aversion stance of investors in a narrower sense. On the other hand, in case of significance of both but of oppo-
site sign, this could tentatively be interpreted as a signal for increasing investor appetite for risk. The results in figure 15 
suggest that at times such interpretation problems could even be observed for the F-GRAIs. However, this is not the case 
at the beginning of the latest stress period, in particular when looking at equity markets, but also initially for the equity-
bond data set. This further supports the notion that investor risk aversion itself increased during the initial stage.   
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with values of 0.45 or larger highlighted.38 The results for the longer period of November 8, 2000 to 
March 12, 2008 can be summarized as follows: 
  Comparing the correlation coefficients across the two methods of calculating the variance-
covariance matrices, the differences are in general relatively small. The exception is the 
merged-set F-GRAI with 12-week return periods. 
  Shortening return periods is usually accompanied by an increase in the correlation coeffi-
cients, ceteris paribus. Market-based alternative indicators are likely to be relatively volatile 
given the continuous adjustments to changing market conditions. Hence longer return peri-
ods might make it harder to capture this via the (G)RAI indicators. This is due to the implied 
smoothing effect. However, for the merged-set F-GRAI and the equity-only R-RAI-C the 
choice of a 12-week return period resulted in higher correlation coefficients than either 24- 
or 4-week return periods. 
  For the most part, the factor-extended (G)RAIs exhibit a higher correlation with the first prin-
cipal component of the alternative indicators than the corresponding (G)RAIs without the 
factor extension. For the merged equity-bond data set, however, such a correlation advan-
tage is obtained only for the 24-week return F-GRAI. The difference between the correlation 
coefficients obtained for the merged-set 12-week return F-GRAI based on scaled VCV ma-
trices and for the corresponding merged-set R-GRAI is negligible, though. 
The second panel of table 4 explores the stability of results by focusing on the last five years of the 
sample period. The correlation coefficients obtained for the preferred combination of scaled VCV 
matrices and 12-week returns over this shorter recent period tend to be smaller. An exception is the 
corresponding merged-set F-GRAI. There we find a correlation advantage over the respective 
merged-set R-GRAI calculated with scaled (co-)variances and 12-week returns.  
Overall, the correlation analysis therefore supports the conclusion that the gap between market-
based and theory-based indicators can be considerably reduced when accounting for such specifi-
cation effects in the construction of indicators. In particular for the last years, the F-GRAIs obtained 
with the preferred setup of scaled VCV matrices and 12-week return periods are not only more ap-
pealing from a theoretical point of view. They also exhibit a higher degree of co-movement with the 
common component of the market-based risk aversion indicators than the corresponding R-GRAIs.  
However, across all GRAI variants the largest correlation coefficient is observed for the 4-week 
return merged-set R-GRAI without the factor extension. This implies that a correlation analysis is 
                                                  
38 The first principal component (explaining about 71% of the overall variance) was calculated for weekly (Wednesday) 
observations (going from April 1, 1998 to March 12, 2008) of the following four indicators: the Citi Macro Risk Index 
(Bloomberg Ticker: MRI CITI Index), the risk aversion indicator implied by the Morgan Stanley Global Risk Demand Index 
(Ticker: STGRDI Index), the  Westpac Risk Aversion Index (Ticker: WRAIRISK Index), and the UBS G10 Carry Risk In-
dex Plus (ULTAFXRI Index). Where necessary, values were multiplied by -1 to correspond to a risk aversion interpreta-
tion. Data for the original alternative indices were downloaded from Bloomberg.   
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illustrative but should not be a major criterion on which to base preferences concerning the specifi-
cation of an indicator. The correlation between two series only measures their degree of co-
movement. However, apart from the problem that by aggregating across several alternative indica-
tors one still does not necessarily arrive at an ideal yardstick of investor risk appetite changes, 
other considerations are more important criteria, like the plausibility of results and underlying as-
sumptions. As figure 16 shows, during the latest crisis period the 12-week return equity-only and 
merged-set F-GRAIs delivered more plausible results and so seem preferable to the 4-week return 
merged-set R-GRAI. The F-GRAIs are also more in line with the common component of the alter-
native market-based risk aversion indicators. 
4. Summary and Conclusions  
Changes in investors’ risk appetite are more and more recognized as important factors when as-
sessing financial markets stability. While this creates an obvious need for quantification, currently 
available risk appetite indicators are not satisfactory. Thus it is essential to gain a better under-
standing of how existing indicators actually work.  
Focusing on the (G)RAI class of indicators, this study analyses how indicator results obtained for 
samples of stock indices respectively stock and bond indices combined are shaped by the various 
choices made when constructing such an indicator. Initial decisions include the choice of the length 
of return periods and how to proxy for the asset riskiness at the beginning of the return period. For 
the latter, we consider two options, namely using short-term asset risk measures based on scaling 
weekly return (co-)variances or longer-term risk measures derived via a temporal aggregation of 
weekly return (co-)variances over a few weeks. One also has to decide whether to assume a mono-
tonic or a linear relationship between asset excess returns and appropriately lagged risk measures 
when deriving the risk aversion indicator. Furthermore, one has to choose whether to derive it as a  
correlation- or regression-based indicator. The Kumar and Persaud (2002) GRAI indicator we focus 
on is a rank-correlation indicator and thus based on the more general case of a monotonic relation-
ship. Finally, when constructing a GRAI another decision concerns whether to account for a de-
pendence between asset returns by applying a factor extension as proposed by Misina (2006). 
Aside from analyzing how all these decisions influence the indicator one ends up with, the main 
goal of this study is to find a combination of decisions that overall delivers the best empirical per-
formance of the resulting risk aversion indicator in terms of certain plausibility and consistency crite-
ria.  
For comparability reasons, Misina (2006) applied his indicator to a similar FX data set as Kumar 
and Persaud (2002). One contribution of the current paper therefore consists of applying the factor-
extended GRAI approach not only to individual financial market segments, but also to a large 
pooled data set covering equity and bond markets together. Furthermore, a spuriously different  
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behavior of GRAIs from their factor-extended versions can arise as a consequence of the normali-
zation of eigenvectors alone, unlike argued by Misina (2006), being insufficient for defining unique 
vectors. We therefore introduce a normalization-plus restriction for the factorization step to ensure 
the uniqueness of eigenvectors. This leads to our modified factor-extended rank-correlation F-GRAI 
as another major contribution of the present paper. Finally, we systematically investigate to what 
extent the factor extension in combination with the other construction choices leads to an improve-
ment of the GRAI’s empirical performance. Our most important guideline in this respect is the over-
all plausibility of the indicators with respect to the implied aggregate risk appetite changes during 
crisis times, in particular the recent period of financial market turmoil. However, another contribution 
of this paper is the development of additional consistency criteria for evaluating e.g. the relative 
attractiveness of F-GRAIs versus R-GRAIs. These criteria are based on violations of an important 
implicit assumption used in the construction of the GRAIs, namely intra-return period asset risk 
ranking stability. 
Summing up the main empirical results, based on asset risk ranking stability considerations we pre-
fer the use of scaled VCV matrices when constructing the weekly GRAI indicators for the equity-
only and the merged equity and bond data sets. Furthermore, a return period length of 12 weeks 
appears to be a good compromise between the smoothness supplied by longer return periods and 
the loss of potentially important short-term information. Finally, for deriving an indicator for changes 
in average investor risk aversion the GRAI rank-correlation approach seems overall preferable to 
the linear correlation or regression RAI variants. This holds in particular when the factor extension 
is applied. Focusing more narrowly on the GRAIs obtained for the preferred combination of 12-
week returns and scaled (co-)variances, in the equity-only case we find that the plausibility of re-
sults during the latest crisis strongly benefits from applying the rank correlation of Kumar and Per-
saud (2002) combined with our modified version of the Misina (2006) factor-transformation exten-
sion. For the larger cross-section of the merged set of bond and stock indices, on the other hand, 
also the GRAI without factor extension indicates a significant increase in investor risk aversion at 
least for some time in August 2007. However, although the larger cross-section is likely to pose a 
challenge due to the additional complexity of the factorization step, the merged-set factor-extended 
GRAI still fares quite well in terms of overall plausibility, too. Finally, over the period of March 2003 
to March 2008, both the equity-only and the merged-set factor-extended GRAIs are also more 
highly correlated with the first principal component (PC) obtained for four market-based risk aver-
sion indicators than the corresponding GRAIs without factor extension. This demonstrates the im-
portance of taking into account indicator construction decisions as one way of potentially reducing 
the gap between market-based and theory-based indicators noted in ECB (2007b). 
At the end of this paper, we thus have obtained two new feasible factor-extended GRAIs – one for 
stock markets alone, one for stock and bond markets combined – which seem very promising for  
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financial stability supervision purposes and future empirical applications. However, that is only one 
major achievement of the paper. Most importantly, we have gained a much better understanding of 
the chosen risk appetite indicator concept, and we have seen how strongly the quality of indicator 
results depends on technical implementation decisions. It is therefore absolutely essential to take 
this into account when using such indicators in practice.   
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Appendix 
Name Ticker Abbreviation
MSCI USA MXUS Index  US 
MSCI Canada USD MSDUCA Index  CA 
MSCI Japan USD MSDUJN Index  JN 
MSCI UK USD MSDUUK Index  UK 
MSCI Germany USD MSDUGR Index  GR 
MSCI France USD MSDUFR Index  FR 
MSCI Ireland USD MSDUIE Index  IE 
MSCI Austria USD MSDUAT Index  AT 
MSCI Belgium USD MSDUBE Index  BE 
MSCI Netherlands USD MSDUNE Index  NE 
MSCI Italy USD MSDUIT Index  IT 
MSCI Spain USD MSDUSP Index  SP 
MSCI Finland USD MSDUFI Index  FI 
MSCI Norway USD MSDUNO Index  NO 
MSCI Sweden USD MSDUSW Index  SW 
MSCI Australia USD MSDUAS Index  AS 
MSCI New Zealand USD MSDUNZ Index  NZ 
MSCI Hong Kong USD MSDUHK Index  HK 
MSCI Emerging Markets Indonesia MSEUSINF Index  INF 
MSCI Malaysia USD MSDUMAF Index  MAF 
MSCI Emerging Markets Turkey  MSEUSTK Index  TK 
MSCI Argentina MXAR Index  AR 
MSCI Brazil MXBR Index  BR 
MSCI Emerging Markets South Africa MSEUSSA Index  SA 
Table 1
MSCI Stock Indices (USD)
Sources: MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital Intl.), Bloomberg.  








1 Russian Default and LTCM Crisis 01-Jun-1998 17-Aug-1998 14-Oct-1998 03-Jun-1998 19-Aug-1998 14-Oct-1998
2 Brazil's Crisis 06-Jan-1999 13-Jan-1999 29-Jan-1999 06-Jan-1999 13-Jan-1999 03-Feb-1999
3 NASDAQ Bubble Burst 10-Mar-2000 03-Apr-2000 10-May-2000 15-Mar-2000 05-Apr-2000 10-May-2000
4 Turkey's Crisis 05-Feb-2001 19-Feb-2001 05-Mar-2001 07-Feb-2001 21-Feb-2001 07-Mar-2001
5 September 11th, 2001 11-Sep-2001 11-Sep-2001 06-Nov-2001 12-Sep-2001 12-Sep-2001 07-Nov-2001
6
WorldCom Scandal and Brazil's 
Elections 23-Apr-2002 19-Jun-2002 29-Oct-2002 24-Apr-2002 19-Jun-2002 30-Oct-2002
7
Run-up to US Federal Reserve 
Monetary Policy Tightening Cycle 02-Apr-2004 02-Apr-2004 30-Jun-2004 07-Apr-2004 07-Apr-2004 30-Jun-2004
8
Ford and General Motors 
Downgrades 14-Feb-2005 16-Mar-2005 19-May-2005 16-Feb-2005 16-Mar-2005 25-May-2005
9
Turkey's Crisis (and Previous 
Iceland Crisis) 31-Mar-2006 11-May-2006 24-Jul-2006 05-Apr-2006 17-May-2006 26-Jul-2006
10 China's Stock Market Correction 27-Feb-2007 27-Feb-2007 19-Mar-2007 28-Feb-2007 28-Feb-2007 21-Mar-2007
11
US Subprime Mortgage Crisis and 





Highlighted in Figures (Weekly Entries)
Notes: Except for the table entries highlighted/ in boldface, the dating of the (pre-) crisis periods follows González-Hermosillo (2008). Given the 
weekly frequency applied in the analysis, the last three columns indicate the corresponding (following) Wednesday dates for the highlighted/marked 
entries in the later figures. 





Financial Distress Periods from 1998 to 2008: Datings
Table 2: List of Special Events’ Periods Highlighted in Figures 
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Returns on MSCI Index for the US
1-week returns 4-week returns 12-week returns









Sources: MSCI, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 1: Returns of MSCI Index for the US: Returns over 1, 4, and 12 weeks 
Variance Proxies for MSCI Index Returns: US, Indonesia (INF)
Variances: scaling by 12 or temporal aggregation over 12 weeks
Variance weekly returns, scaled: US
Variance 12-w. returns,temporally aggr.: US
Variance weekly returns, scaled: INF (rhs)
Variance 12-w. returns,temporally aggr.: INF (rhs)

















Variance Proxies for First Three Factors
Based on: weekly return (co-)variances, scaled by 12






Based on: weekly return (co-)variances, temporal aggregation over 12 weeks
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3






Sources: MSCI, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 2: Variance Proxies: MSCI Index Returns (US, Indonesia), First Three Factors  
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GRAI Comparison: 12-week (Factor) Returns
(Co-)Variances of weekly returns, scaled by 12
12-week returns; scaled var. 12-week factor returns; scaled var.










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(Co-)Variances, temporal aggregation over 12 weeks
12-week returns; temporally aggr. var. 12-week factor returns; temporally aggr. var.










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2006 - mid-March 2008
12-week returns; scaled var.
12-week factor returns; scaled var.
12-week returns; temporally aggr. var.
12-week factor returns; temporally aggr. var.












Sources: MSCI, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 3: GRAIs (12-week Return Periods): Equity-Only  
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GRAI Comparison: 24-/12-/4-week (Factor) Returns
2006 - mid-March 2008
24-week Return Periods
24-week returns; scaled var.
24-week factor returns; scaled var.
24-week returns; temporally aggr. var.
24-week factor returns; temporally aggr. var.













12-week returns; scaled var.
12-week factor returns; scaled var.
12-week returns; temporally aggr. var.
12-week factor returns; temporally aggr. var.













4-week returns; scaled var.
4-week factor returns; scaled var.
4-week returns; temporally aggr. var.
4-week factor returns; temporally aggr. var.













Sources: MSCI, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 4: GRAIs (24-/12-/4-week Return Periods): Equity-Only – since 2006  
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Comparisons: GRAI versus RAI-C: 12-week (Factor) Returns
(Co-)Variances: scaled or temporally aggregated
Returns; var. scaled
RAI-C (Correlation) GRAI (Rank correlation)











RAI-C (Correlation) GRAI (Rank correlation)










Returns; var. temp. aggr.
RAI-C (Correlation) GRAI (Rank correlation)










Factors; var. temp. aggr.
RAI-C (Correlation) GRAI (Rank correlation)











Sources: MSCI, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 5: GRAI versus RAI-C (12-week Return Periods): Equity-Only  
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RAI-R and First Factor Effect: 12-week (Factor) Returns
(Co-)Variances of weekly returns, scaling by 12
RAI-R and First-Factor Implied RA
RAI-R: Returns RAI-R: Factors Implied by First Factor





t-values, RAI-R: 12-week (Factor) Returns
t-value, RAI-R: Returns t-value, RAI-R: Factors






RAI-R and First Factor Effect: 12-week (Factor) Returns
(Co-)Variances of 12-week returns via temporal aggregation
RAI-R and First-Factor Implied RA
RAI-R: Returns RAI-R: Factors Implied by First Factor






t-values, RAI-R: 12-week (Factor) Returns
t-value, RAI-R: Returns t-value, RAI-R: Factors






Sources: MSCI, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 6: RAI-R vs. RA Implied by First Factor (12-week Return Periods): Equity-Only  
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Sources: Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg.
ASG G4T0 Australian Government, 7-10 years
BDG G4D0 German Federal Governments, 7-10 years
UKG G4L0 U.K.Gilts, 7-10 years
JPNG G4Y0 Japanese Governments, 7-10 years 
CAG G4C0 Canadian Governments, 7-10 years
Extended Lists: Also
HYCCC H0A3 US High Yield, CCC Rated and Lower
HYBB_B H0A4 US High Yield, BB-B Rated
EMSOVCCC I3GV USD CCC and Lower Rated EM Sovereigns
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GRAIs: Equity vs. Eq/Bonds/USG Indices
12-week Factor Returns
(Co-)Variances via scaling























(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation











(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation
Equity Bonds/USG Eq/Bonds/USG










Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 7: GRAIs (12-week Return Periods): Equity vs. Bond/US Government Bond Indices  
  - 31 -
GRAIs: Equity vs. Eq/Bonds/USG Indices
12-week Factor Returns
(Co-)Variances via scaling

























(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation












(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation
Equity Bonds/USG Eq/Bonds/USG








Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 8: GRAIs (12-week Return Periods): Equity vs. Bond/US Government Bond Indices – since 2006  
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GRAIs: Government Bond Indices Added to Equities/Bonds
12-week Factor Returns
(Co-)Variances via scaling

























(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation












(Co-)Variances via temporal aggregation
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Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 9: GRAIs (12-week Return Periods): Adding Government Bond Indices – since 2006 
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GRAIs: Equity vs. Eq/Bonds/USG Indices
(Co-)Variances via scaling or temporal aggregation
Factor Returns, 12 weeks























Factor Returns, 4 weeks















Eq/Bonds/USG; VCV temp. aggr.








Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 10: GRAIs (12-/4-week Return Periods): Equity vs. Equity/Bond/US Government Bond Indices 
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Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 4-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via scaling













Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.

























Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.








Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 4-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via temporal aggregation













Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.

























Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.








Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 11: Max, Min, Spread: Change of Variance Ranks / GRAIs (4-week Return Periods)  
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Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 12-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via scaling














Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.






















Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.









Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 12-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via temporal aggregation















Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.

























Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.










Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 12: Max, Min, Spread: Change of Variance Ranks / GRAIs (12-week Return Periods)  
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Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 24-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via scaling















Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.























Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.









Change of Var. Ranks: F-GRAI and R-GRAI, 24-w. returns
Max, min, spread; (co-)variances via temporal aggregation















Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Equity Only
Factor Var. Return Var.






















Max-Min Spread of Changes of Var. Ranks: Eq/Bonds/USG
Factor Var. Return Var.











Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 13: Max, Min, Spread: Change of Variance Ranks / GRAIs (24-week Return Periods)  
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Risk Ranking Stability: Cov. Scaling vs. Temp. Aggregation
Diff. in Max-Min Spread of Changes in Var. Ranks for Cov. Temp. Aggr. vs. Scaling
Equity Only, 4-week return periods
F-GRAI R-GRAI








Equity Only, 12-week return periods
F-GRAI R-GRAI





Equity Only, 24-week return periods
F-GRAI R-GRAI
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Eq/Bonds/USG, 4-week return periods
F-GRAI R-GRAI





Eq/Bonds/USG, 12-week return periods
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Eq/Bonds/USG, 24-week return periods
F-GRAI R-GRAI
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Risk Ranking Stability of F-GRAI vs. R-GRAI
Difference between R-GRAI and F-GRAI Max-Min Spread of Changes in Var. Ranks
Equity Only, 4-week return periods
scaled cov. temp. aggr. cov.






Equity Only, 12-week return periods
scaled cov. temp. aggr. cov.





Equity Only, 24-week return periods
scaled cov. temp. aggr. cov.





Equity Only, scaled cov.
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Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 14: Risk Ranking Stability Criterion and GRAIs  
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GRAIs and Variance Changes over Return Periods
12-week return periods, scaled (co-)variances
Notes: Critical values for two-sided significance test of rank correlation at 5% level (see Zar (1972)). 
Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg. Own calculations.
F-GRAI (Equity-Only)
Sign Correspondence in Significance Rank Corr.(Factor Var. Changes, Past Factor Var.) F-GRAI







Sign Correspondence in Significance Rank Corr.(Return Var. Changes, Past Return Var.) R-GRAI







Sign Correspondence in Significance Rank Corr.(Factor Var. Changes, Past Factor Var.) F-GRAI







Sign Correspondence in Significance Rank Corr.(Return Var. Changes, Past Return Var.) R-GRAI






Figure 15: GRAIs and Variance Changes over Return Periods 
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RAI-R RAI-C GRAI RAI-R RAI-C GRAI
for: 4-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.541 0.575 0.424 0.529 0.580 0.392
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.556 0.592 0.407 0.538 0.593 0.328
Stock Indices; Returns 0.249 0.246 0.340 0.212 0.228 0.312
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns 0.446 0.472 0.600 0.410 0.464 0.603
for: 12-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.436 0.522 0.408 0.395 0.518 0.410
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.451 0.537 0.496 0.416 0.524 0.360
Stock Indices; Returns 0.208 0.305 0.302 0.146 0.300 0.302
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns 0.352 0.439 0.500 0.299 0.443 0.509
for: 24-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.238 0.232 0.250 0.287 0.227 0.273
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.253 0.244 0.329 0.285 0.231 0.254
Stock Indices; Returns 0.023 0.145 0.114 0.095 0.183 0.086
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns 0.139 0.183 0.233 0.170 0.194 0.230
for: 4-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.520 0.590 0.390 0.517 0.597 0.398
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.534 0.607 0.393 0.526 0.612 0.314
Stock Indices; Returns 0.258 0.278 0.314 0.207 0.245 0.279
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns 0.449 0.508 0.595 0.412 0.488 0.598
for: 12-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.366 0.493 0.403 0.343 0.530 0.384
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.388 0.520 0.564 0.378 0.544 0.361
Stock Indices; Returns 0.132 0.241 0.224 0.067 0.252 0.252
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns 0.289 0.397 0.479 0.242 0.422 0.491
for: 24-week return periods
Stock Indices; Factor Returns 0.138 0.101 0.234 0.164 0.119 0.205
Stock & Bond Indices (+US GovB); Factor Returns 0.165 0.131 0.402 0.175 0.128 0.218
Stock Indices; Returns -0.134 -0.070 -0.136 -0.065 0.018 -0.113
Stock & Bond Indices  (+US GovB); Returns -0.003 -0.003 0.125 0.022 0.038 0.146
Correlation (April 1, 1998 to March 12,2008) between...
RAI_MS RAI_WP RAI_UBS
                                          RAI_MC 0.482 0.562 0.648
                                          RAI_MS 0.798 0.600
                                          RAI_WP 0.557
Table 4
Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Morgan Stanley, Westpac Strategy Group, UBS, Bloomberg. Own 
calculations.
Shorter Period: March 12, 2003 - March 12, 2008
Notes: Principal component calculated for weekly (Wednesday) observations (April 1, 1998 to March 12, 2008) of the following four indicators: the Citi 
Macro Risk Index (RAI_MC), the risk aversion indicator implied by the Global Risk Demand Index (RAI_MS) of Morgan Stanley, the Westpac Risk 
Aversion Index (RAI_WP), and the UBS G10 Carry Risk Index Plus (RAI_UBS). Data for the indices were downloaded from Bloomberg. Where necessary, 
values were multiplied by -1 to correspond to a risk aversion interpretation. Correlations between (G)RAIs and principal component calculated for weekly 
(Wednesday) observations over the indicated periods. Correlation coefficients with absolute values larger than 0.45 highlighted/in boldface.  
Correlations with First Principal Component of Four Market-Based Risk Aversion Indicators
scaled (co-)variances temp. aggr. (co-)variances
Period: Nov 08, 2000 - March 12, 2008
 
Table 4: Correlations of (G)RAIs with First Principal Component of Four Market-Based Risk Aversion 
Indicators 
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Equity-Only GRAIs vs. PC of Alternative RA Indicators
GRAIs: 1-week return (co-)variances, scaled
F-GRAI, 12-week return periods
F-GRAI, 4-week return periods
Principal Component (rhs)











R-GRAI, 12-week return periods
R-GRAI, 4-week return periods
Principal Component (rhs)












Eq/Bonds/USG GRAIs vs. PC of Alternative RA Indicators
GRAIs: 1-week return (co-)variances, scaled
F-GRAI, 12-week return periods
F-GRAI, 4-week return periods
Principal Component (rhs)











R-GRAI, 12-week return periods
R-GRAI, 4-week return periods
Principal Component (rhs)












Sources: MSCI, Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Morgan Stanley, Westpac Strategy Group, 
UBS, Bloomberg. Own calculations. 
Figure 16: GRAIs vs. First Principal Component of Four Market-Based Risk Aversion Indicators  
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